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Marriage Rights and the Good Life:
A Sociological Theory of Marriage and
Constitutional Law
Ari Ezra Waldman*
The national debate over marriage discrimination against gay and lesbian Americans is
playing out in state legislatures, at the ballot, and in the federal courts under the
conventional notion that liberal rhetoric, the liberal political philosophy indebted to
John Rawls, and the unencumbered self at their cores are the bases for the most
effective arguments for the gay rights movement. Pro-gay groups talk often about
rights, liberty, and the freedom to choose whom to love. Even in court, gay rights
groups repeat the Supreme Court’s statements about a fundamental right to make the
choice to marry. But the conventional wisdom ignores the important social role
marriage plays in society and the way in which the cultural and sociological value of
marriage and gay relationships can help jump the constitutional hurdles facing those
seeking the freedom to marry.
This is the first in a series of three Articles investigating the underappreciated role that
the social theory of Emile Durkheim plays in the quest for the freedom to marry for
gay Americans. To that end, this Article begins the discussion by examining the
Durkheimian legal arguments that go unnoticed in equal protection and due process
claims against marriage discrimination. This Article challenges two assumptions: first,
that the most effective legal argument for marriage rights is a purely liberal one, and
second, that the substance and rhetoric of liberal toleration cannot exist symbiotically
in the marriage discrimination debate with a more robust politics based on the
experiential social value of marriage and gay relationships. The freedom to marry is
both a liberal right and a piece of the good life. Drawing on Durkheim, this Article
discusses a sociological theory of marriage and argues that the constitutional case for
the freedom to marry is not just about the rights of equal protection and due process,
but also about the sociology of marriage. In other words, a successful constitutional
argument depends on the recognition that marriage is a social good with both general
and everyday demonstrable benefits for the married couple and society as a whole.

* Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate, Columbia University Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences, Department of Sociology; Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; A.B., magna cum laude, Harvard College.
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Introduction
The campaign to end marriage discrimination against gay and
lesbian Americans has largely been the bailiwick of progressives. When
1
he endorsed same-sex marriage, President Obama joined a long list of
2
3
moderate and liberal friends: 2 former presidents, 14 current governors,
1. Matt Compton, President Obama Supports Same Sex Marriage, The White House Blog (May
9, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/05/09/president-obama-supports-same-sexmarriage.
2. Bill Clinton Supports Marriage Equality in New York, HRC Blog (May 5, 2011),
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/bill-clinton-supports-marriage-equality-in-new-york; Paul Brandeis
Raushenbush, President Jimmy Carter Authors New Bible Book, Answers Hard Biblical Questions,
The Huffington Post (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/president-jimmycarter-bible-book_n_1349570.html (“I personally think it is very fine for gay people to be married in
civil ceremonies.”).
3. Lincoln Chafee, Gay Marriage: A Question of Fairness, The Huffington Post (June 18,
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lincoln-chafee/gay-marriage-a-question-o_b_217389.html (Lincoln
Chafee, I-R.I.); Civil Rights/Marriage Equality, Maggie Hassan: Governor, http://www.
maggiehassan.com/issues/civil-rightsmarriage-equality (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (Maggie Hassan, DN.H.); John Curran, Peter Shumlin, Vermont Governor, Presides Over Marriage of Lesbian Couple,
The Huffington Post (Aug. 17, 2011, 5:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/17/petershumlin-gay-marriage-vermont_n_929486.html (Peter Shumlin, D-Vt.); Andrew Garber, Gregoire
Proposes Legislation to Legalize Gay Marriage, Seattle Times (Jan. 4, 2012), http://seattletimes.
nwsource.com/html/politicsnorthwest/2017157564_gregoire_to_introduce_gay_marr.html
(Christine
Gregoire, D-Wash.); Governor Abercrombie: Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, Hawaii
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and more than two hundred members of the Senate and House of
4
5
Representatives, among many more progressive organizations, and
6
businesses. Of those high-profile supporters of same-sex marriage, only
three, Republicans Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, Rob Portman of Ohio,
and Richard Hanna of New York, are national Republicans currently in
7
office. And although that is not to say that same-sex marriage has no wellknown conservative supporters—President George W. Bush’s Solicitor
8
9
General, Ted Olson; his Vice President, Dick Cheney; his 2004 campaign

Reporter (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.hawaiireporter.com/gov-abercrombie-same-sex-marriage-banunconstitutional/123 (Neil Abercrombie, D-Haw.); Alissa Groeninger & Rex W. Huppke, Quinn Makes
It Clear He Supports Same-Sex Marriage in Illinois, Chi. Trib. (May 11, 2012), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2012-05-11/news/ct-met-gay-marriage-illinois-20120511_1_civil-unions-marriage-billmarriage-rights (Pat Quinn, D-Ill.); Maggie Haberman, Cuomo Says All States Should Pass Gay
Marriage, Politico (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67076.html (Andrew
Cuomo, D-N.Y.); Jerry Brown: Gay-Marriage Ban Should Be Invalidated, Los Angeles Times (Dec. 19,
2008), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2008/12/attorney-genera.html (Jerry Brown, D-Cal.); John
Kitzhaber on Civil Rights, On The Issues (last updated Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.ontheissues.org/
governor/John_Kitzhaber_Civil_Rights.htm (John Kitzhaber, D-Ore.); Markell Supports Legalizing
Gay Marriage in Del., NBC10 Phil (Mar. 2, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/
local/Markell-Supports-Legalizing-Gay-Marriage-in-Del-141234223.html (Jack Markell, D-Del.); Tim
Nelson, Dayton Pushes for Same-Sex Marriage at Capitol Rally, Minn. Pub. Radio (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/04/14/gay-rights-rally (Mark Dayton, D-Minn.);
Martin O’Malley, Dignity for All: Why I Signed Same-Sex Marriage into Maryland Law, The
Huffington Post (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gov-martin-omalley/maryland-gaymarriage_b_1314982.html (Martin O’Malley, D-Md.); Statement of Governor Patrick on President
Obama’s Support for Same-Sex Marriage, Mass.gov (May 9, 2012), http://www.mass.gov/governor/
pressoffice/pressreleases/2012/2012509-governor-statement-on-president-support-of-same-sex-marriage.
html (Deval Patrick, D-Mass.); Stephen Reader, CT Gov. Dan Malloy Talks Budget, Same Sex
Marriage, WNYC.com (June 15, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/2011/jun/15/
connecticut-governor-dan-malloy (Dan Malloy, D-Conn.).
4. See List of Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States: Members of the U.S. House
of Representatives, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_supporters_of_same-sex_marriage_
in_the_United_States#Members_of_the_U.S._House_of_Representatives (last modified Mar. 21, 2013)
(collecting sources); List of Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States: U.S. Senators,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_supporters_of_same-sex_marriage_in_the_United_States#
U.S._Senators (last modified Mar. 21, 2013) (collecting sources).
5. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, In Largely Symbolic Move, N.A.A.C.P. Votes to Endorse Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2012, at A15, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/us/politics/naacpendorses-same-sex-marriage.html; Julie Bolcer, LULAC, Nation’s Oldest Latino Group, Backs
Marriage Equality, Advocate.com (July 1, 2012), http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/
2012/07/01/lulac-nation’s-oldest-latino-group-backs-marriage-equality.
6. See, e.g., Zack Ford, REI Sporting Goods Company Endorses Marriage Equality in Washington,
ThinkProgress.org (Aug. 14, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/08/14/687751/rei-sporting-goodscompany-endorses-marriage-equality-in-washington (noting that REI joined Amazon.com, Starbucks,
Microsoft, Vulcan, and Nike in publicly supporting same-sex marriage rights in Washington State).
7. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Is First GOP Member of Congress to Support Marriage Equality,
Towleroad (July 13, 2012), http://www.towleroad.com/2012/07/iliana-ros-lehtinen-is-first-gop-memberof-congress-to-support-marriage-equality.html; Jeremy W. Peters, G.O.P. Senator Says He Has a Gay
Son, and Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2013, at A11.
8. Jo Becker, A Conservative’s Road to Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
2009, at A1.
9. Dick Cheney Saw Political Peril in Expressing His Support for Same Sex Marriage Too Soon,
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guru, Ken Mehlman; and former Governor of Utah, Ambassador to
11
China, and Republican Presidential candidate Jon Huntsman are just
four examples—or does not benefit from thousands donated by some
12
conservative fundraising lions, it is hard to argue that support for samesex marriage is, to date, anything but a cause célèbre of liberals and
13
14
libertarians. And that support is couched in traditional liberal terms.
Governors Dan Malloy of Connecticut and Lincoln Chafee of Rhode
Island, for example, explained their support for marriage freedom using
the rhetoric of rights, liberty, and equality. Governor Malloy’s position is a
15
matter of equal “dignity” for all persons; Governor Chafee supports the
16
freedom to marry because it is a simple question of “fairness.” Modern
liberal philosophy is characterized by this tolerance and value neutrality
and, therefore, supports ending marriage discrimination quite easily.
17
18
19
Under the enlightenment framework of Kant, Hagel, Habermas, and
20
Rawls, liberal democracies should be founded on respect for individual
rights and free of the personal prejudices and private morality of their
leaders. More specifically, when making public policy, leaders should
bracket away what any comprehensive doctrine (like religion, for
example) might say about homosexuality and support and enact laws that
21
22
treat everyone equally. Libertarians should agree: To them, government

Towleroad (July 30, 2012), http://www.towleroad.com/2012/07/cheneymarriage.html.
10. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republicans Sign Brief in Support of Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
2013, at A1; Gay Marriage’s Unlikely Hero, The Daily Beast (June 25, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.
com/articles/2011/06/25/bush-republican-party-leader-ken-mehlman-unlikely-hero-of-new-york-s-gaymarriage-vote.html.
11. Jon Huntsmann, Gay Marriage Is a Conservative Cause, The American Conservative (Feb.
21, 2013), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/marriage-equality-is-a-conservative-cause485;
Stolberg, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Billionaire GOP Donor Paul Singer Donates $150,000 to Maine Marriage Equality
Effort, Towleroad (July 24, 2012), http://www.towleroad.com/2012/07/billionaire-gop-donor-paul-singerdonates-150000-to-maine-marriage-equality-efforts.html.
13. See, e.g., Jay Root, Major Cruz Backer Favors Same-Sex Marriage, Marijuana Legalization,
The Star-Telegram (July 3, 2012), http://www.star-telegram.com/2012/07/03/4077826/major-cruz-backerfavors-same.html.
14. Ideas that we consider “liberal” and “libertarian” are founded upon similar notions of
individual rights and autonomy. Although these philosophies diverge on many things, including the
role of government in supporting the disadvantaged, they both rely on neo-Kantian ideas of freedom
and individual liberty.
15. See Reader, supra note 3.
16. See Chafee, supra note 3.
17. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott ed., 2009);
Immanuel Kant, Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott & Lara
Denis eds., 2005).
18. Steven M. Cahn, Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts (2005).
19. Id.
20. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) [hereinafter Rawls, A Theory of Justice].
21. This is a brief summary of Rawls’ “political liberalism.” See John Rawls, Political
Liberalism (1993) [hereinafter Rawls, Political Liberalism]. Both this revised theory and Rawls’
original, revolutionary work, A Theory of Justice, will be discussed in this Article.
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has no place in making moral judgments about the intimate relationships
of its citizens. Even the movement’s preferred term, “marriage equality,”
evokes the bedrock principles of liberal toleration, individual rights, and
23
an absence of value judgment.
Many lions of the academy have critiqued this vision of politics.
They argue, roughly, that it is empty and based on a neo-Kantian vision
24
of the self that is detached from real life experiences. It requires us to
ignore the social ties that make us who we are. And marriage is the
antithesis of arm’s length detachment from values. It is a social and
cultural institution that helps constitute the interconnected web of human
society. It is a stabilizing, assimilatory institution that is at the foundation
of local neighborhoods, communities, and the state. To paraphrase Olson,
the former solicitor-general and co-lead counsel in Hollingsworth v. Perry,
the best marriages are stable bonds between two individuals who come
together in social and economic partnership and work hard to create
25
happy, loving, and large households full of children, friends, and guests.
Governments encourage couples to marry because the commitments
they make to one another provide outsized benefits not only to
themselves but also to their families and communities; after all, marriage
26
requires unselfish thinking, for children, family, and community. It is a
transformative social institution that brings two individuals into a union
based on shared aspirations and, in so doing, buys a share in the future
success of society as a whole. To suggest that social and political leaders
can judge this particular institution from a detached, value-neutral vantage
point, as liberal toleration requires, is to deny the interconnectedness of all
things and remain blind to the salient role of the institution of marriage
and the role government plays in fostering social progress through
marriage.
The liberal conception and this sociological or experiential
conception of marriage seem incompatible. These conceptions may
occupy two divergent poles in the realms of moral and political
philosophy, but my concern is the constitutional argument on marriage.

22. Governor Gary Johnson Announces Support for Gay Marriage, The Truth for a Change Blog
(Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.garyjohnson2012.com/governor-gary-johnson-announces-support-for-gaymarriage (“[G]overnment has no business choosing who should be allowed the benefits of marriage
and who should not. . . . As a believer in individual freedom and keeping government out of personal
lives, I simply cannot find a legitimate justification for federal laws, such as the Defense of Marriage
Act, which ‘define’ marriage. That definition should be left to religions and individuals—not
government. Government’s role when it comes to marriage is one of granting benefits and rights to
couples who choose to enter into a marriage ‘contract’.”).
23. Ari Ezra Waldman, “Marriage Equality” and the Power of Words in Law, Towleroad (Feb.
1, 2012), http://www.towleroad.com/2012/02/marriageequalitylaw.html.
24. See generally Sandel, Liberalism, supra note 37.
25. Theodore Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, Newsweek, Jan. 18, 2010, at 48.
26. Id.
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The legal case for marriage recognition runs through both the Due
Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
and requires advocates of equality to argue that there is no basis for
antigay marriage discrimination. That constitutional argument, which first
inquires about liberty and equality and then dissects the legitimacy of the
substantive reasons for denial of those rights, reflects the Constitution’s
blend of abstract liberal principles with experiential concepts of
community and social goods. It reflects the fact, as Emile Durkheim
27
noted, that modern society is an essential party to every civil marriage
and bestows the honor of a marriage license on a loving and committed
couple both to ensure the perpetuation of the social norms of marriage and
to benefit society as a whole. The real debate over marriage, then, is not
about simple equality; rather, it is a question as to whether marriages of
persons of the same sex both enhance liberty and contribute to and
benefit society in the way that opposite-sex marriages do. Answering that
question requires pro-marriage recognition advocates to add arguments
about the social good of the freedom to marry to liberal arguments about
individual rights, equality, and toleration.
This Article challenges two assumptions: (1) The most effective
28
legal argument for marriage rights is a purely liberal one, and (2) the
substance and rhetoric of liberal toleration and experience cannot exist
symbiotically in the marriage discrimination debate. Let me be clear:
Liberalism is neither inconsistent with nor hostile to marriage; liberal
toleration can play an essential role in winning over the hearts and minds
of a large swath of the population and can help navigate constitutional
arguments about liberty and equality. And yet liberalism can only take us
so far. With respect to marriage and gay relationships, liberal toleration
has three missing pieces. First, it is empty, denying us arguments based on
empirical observation and group narrative; second, it is incompatible with

27. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 20 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984) [hereinafter
Durkheim, Division of Labor]; Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method 50–51 (Steven
Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans., 1982)) [hereinafter Durkheim, Sociological Method].
28. The first half of Carlos Ball’s scholarly analysis in Moral Foundations for a Discourse on
Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 Geo. L.J. 1871 (1997), is similar to my
argument criticizing liberal toleration in the same-sex marriage context. But Professor Ball’s
conclusion retained the basic framework of liberalism when he sought to fill the void left by the failure
of liberal toleration. I agree with Professor Ball’s central thesis—namely, that
Rawlsian liberalism, by itself, proves incapable of providing a coherent political framework
that engages the normative issues necessary to the debate over whether society should
recognize and accept same-sex relationships. A Rawlsian liberalism that insists on moral
bracketing and defining the right independently of the good consequently fails to address
the normative aspects of the controversy and is, to some extent, irrelevant to the debate,
but also departs significantly from his proposed answer to the problem of liberalism and same-sex
marriage. Id. at 1884. However, I depart from Professor Ball’s thoughtful analysis where he retains
Rawlsian liberalism in his conclusion. At the time, of course, Professor Ball did not have the benefit of
reflecting on the course of and legal arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry.
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gay political identity; and third, it fails to adequately build the
constitutional case for marriage. Successful equal protection and due
process arguments require us to join liberal toleration with concepts of
sociology and the social value of marriage and gay relationships.
Drawing on the work of Durkheim, phenomenologists like Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, and civic perfectionists like Michael Sandel and Alasdair
MacIntyre, I argue that the constitutional question of marriage freedom
is not merely a legal one but also a sociological one: Equal protection
and due process arguments for marriage require us to join traditional
liberal ideas about rights and autonomy with the social good of
marriage—namely, that marriage is a social good with demonstrable
benefits for the married couple and society as a whole.
To make that argument, Part I of this Article briefly constructs the
concept of “liberal toleration” and applies it to the same-sex marriage
debate. It tracks the straight line between neo-Kantian theory, liberal
neutrality, and marriage equality, but concludes by pointing out the
missing pieces in the liberal neutrality argument. In so doing, I introduce
Durkheim’s conception of marriage as a social fact, assessed only by
empirical analysis of its effects on society. Part II uses Hollingsworth v.
Perry—the federal court challenge to California’s ban on same-sex
marriage—as a case study that proves my argument. Both the broad
substantive holding of the district court and the narrower affirmance of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required the judges to recognize the liberty
29
associated with the freedom to marry and wrestle with the value of
marriage in society and the ways in which gay participation in the
institution of marriage is a social good. Here, I show how Durkheim’s
socio-legal analysis of marriage can play an essential role in winning
constitutional recognition for the freedom to marry. This Article concludes
with a short discussion of the implications of this theory—namely, that the
successful campaigns for marriage should include arguments based on
community and social goods as well as equality and individual rights.

I. Liberalism and Marriage
“Liberal toleration” refers to the principle, as Rawls discussed in
Political Liberalism, that leaders of large, culturally diverse republics
should never meddle in the moral debates of their citizens by deciding
30
that one morality or one truth is the correct path to the good life. On
the contrary, liberals should enact, execute, and interpret laws so as to
protect an individual’s right to choose her own conception of the good

29. Evan Wolfson, founder the pro-marriage organization Freedom to Marry, argues that the
phrase “freedom to marry” is a hybrid term, encompassing the rhetoric of rights and the rhetoric of
the good life.
30. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 21, at xii–xxvi.
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life, free of the comprehensive dogmas of others. To do that, they must
bracket away their own personal, moral, and religious proclivities when
stepping into the political sphere and tolerate the great tapestry of
31
differences among their citizenry.
The goal of this Part is to assess the ability of liberal toleration to
craft successful political and legal arguments for the inclusion of gays in
the institution of marriage. After constructing the basis for liberal
toleration and applying it to the marriage debate, I argue that this view
takes us only part of the way. The doctrine is at once too narrow and too
broad: It does not have the tools to comprehend the importance of
marriage in society—in general, and with respect to gay identity, in
particular—it excludes some of the necessary legal arguments on due
process and equality.
A. Rawls’ “Liberal Toleration”
Liberal toleration is primarily a construct of Rawls’ “political
liberalism,” an assessment of democratic legitimacy and constitutionalism
that did not rely so much on Kant’s metaphysics or the ethereal “original
32
position.” Though the totality of Rawls’ great project to provide a
philosophical foundation for the modern liberal state is beyond the scope
of this Article, we must take a small step back to determine why toleration
is so essential in the Rawlsian state.
In Rawls’ view, fundamental principles of justice—or, the foundations
of society—derive from hypothetical negotiations at the “original position”
33
behind the “veil of ignorance.” The original position is an Archimedean
point, detached from and prior to the encumbrances of society, where
individuals can determine what kind of society they want. But, at this
position, the veil of ignorance means that those hypothetical pre-society
negotiators know very little about themselves: “[N]o one knows his place
in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence,
34
strength and the like.” This scenario is both liberating and cautionary:
You are free to structure society as your perfect, rational mind would
allow, but you have no idea if you will end up a prince or a pauper.
In that context, Rawls believed that any society that developed out
of the original position would be founded on two basic principles: liberty
and equality. The liberty principle holds that everyone must enjoy the
same freedoms of thought, speech, and the freedom to choose one’s way

31. Id.
32. For the latter, see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 20.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id. Nor would they know their sexual orientation, but Rawls never mentioned that
specifically.
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35

in life without government coercion. The second, so-called “difference
principle,” requires that any deviations from equality ultimately make
36
society as a whole, and the most disadvantaged in particular, better off.
37
The Kantian foundations of this construct are well known but, as Rawls
himself argued in Political Liberalism, not essential. This vision of justice
need not answer all questions of morality and philosophy (as Kant would
require), but rather, as a political conception of justice, the complementary
principles of liberty and equality provide a “guiding framework of
deliberation and reflection which helps us reach political agreement on at
38
least the constitutional essentials and the basic questions of justice.”
This is the basic framework of a liberal society in which citizens can
choose their version of the good life, act upon their wishes and desires,
and debate with others about questions of morality and values.
Toleration is necessary because a free and choosing self is
incompatible when government attempts to impose one particular
conception of right and wrong. “[I]t is precisely because we are freely
choosing, independent selves,” a Rawlsian ethic suggests, “that we need
a neutral framework, a framework of rights that refuses to choose among
39
competing values and ends,” or, more specifically, refuses to choose for
us among the myriad possibilities from which we are supposed to choose.
After all, what matters in the Rawlsian ethic is not what ends we choose,
but our ability to choose them: “It is not our aims that primarily reveal our
nature,” but rather it is creating a society that respects our individual
40
rights, for “the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it.” The only
result is a society that does not presuppose or impose any particular
conception of the good, lest it fail to respect persons as autonomous
choosing selves. “The intense convictions of the majority,” Rawls writes as
an example, “if they are indeed mere preferences without any foundation
in the principles of justice antecedently established, have no weight,”
because the state would no longer be neutral among the preferences the
41
autonomous self can choose to have.
Toleration, therefore, means that the government should not affirm
any particular vision of the good life or, to use the common parlance, stay
out of the moral debates of its citizens. The state should not establish an

35. Id. at 14.
36. Id. at 61–62.
37. See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1998) [hereinafter Sandel,
Liberalism]; see also Ari Ezra Waldman, Durkheim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online
Society, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty (forthcoming 2013).
38. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 21, at 156.
39. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy
12 (1996) [hereinafter Sandel, Democracy].
40. Id. (quoting Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 20, at 560).
41. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 20, at 450.
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42

official religion, for example, or give the adherents of one religion more
43
rights than the adherents of any other. Nor should the state mandate that
44
no woman can have an abortion or criminalize the possession or
45
distribution of sex toys simply because of the church’s teachings. When
thinking about these questions in the liberal state, we must bracket away
our religious beliefs and consider only the basic principles of individual
46
liberty and equality.
In our private lives, we can regard our “attachments very differently
47
from the way the political conception supposes.” Privately, there may
be commitments so important that there would be no way that we “could
and should . . . stand apart from [them] and evaluate objectively. . . . [I]t
[would be] simply unthinkable to view [our]selves apart from certain
48
religious, philosophical, and moral convictions . . . .” But, when we turn
from our private lives into the public sphere, those ties, however strong,
have to be left at home, lest we use our antecedent moral prejudices to
infringe on the rights of others. When deciding if all types of picketing
except school-related labor picketing should be banned near a school, for
example, we should bracket our personal opinions as to unpopular views
and the purpose of school grounds and ask ourselves if it is appropriate
49
for the state to accept some type of protest but not others. Similarly,
when considering whether to allow Fred Phelps and the hateful
Westboro Baptist Church to spew all manner of insults at the private

42. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) (“[I]n order to give
effect to the First Amendment’s purpose of requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict
neutrality toward theological questions, courts should not undertake to decide such questions
[regarding theological disputes]. These principles were first expounded in the case of Watson v. Jones,
which declared that judicial intervention in such a controversy would open up ‘the whole subject of the
doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every
religious denomination . . . .’ Courts above all must be neutral, for ‘[t]he law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.’” (alterations in internal
quotations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
43. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 918 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he State
must treat all religions equally, and not favor one over another . . . .”).
44. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (“We need not resolve the difficult question of
when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”).
45. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The State’s primary
justifications for the statute are ‘morality based.’ The asserted interests include ‘discouraging prurient
interests in autonomous sex and the pursuit of sexual gratification unrelated to procreation and
prohibiting the commercial sale of sex.’ These interests in ‘public morality’ cannot constitutionally
sustain the statute after Lawrence.”).
46. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 21, at 215.
47. Id. at 31.
48. Id.
49. In Mosley, the Court wrote that “above all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971).
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funeral of a fallen soldier, we should bracket our distaste for the church’s
language and beliefs and ask whether it is right for a state to silence the
unpopular views of a speaker simply because the state dislikes those
50
views. And when determining the constitutionality of conditioning rights
on a loyalty oath, we should bracket our love of country and wonder
whether we want our rights conditioned on the state forcing us to speak
51
against our better judgment.
Rawls’ political conception of the person, therefore, creates a public
sphere devoid of the often harsh prejudices of religion and morality. In
public, when considering political questions, the political actor leaves his
prejudices behind and tolerates the myriad of differences around him.
Tolerance, therefore, emerges as a central pillar of the Rawlian liberal
state.
B. “Liberal Toleration” and Marriage for Gay Couples
The Rawlsian argument for marriage, in particular, and gay rights, in
general, seems naturally attractive. If executives, legislators, and jurists
bracket away their personal morality, refuse to bring their personal
religious beliefs into the public sphere, and decline to enforce any
comprehensive doctrines on a pluralistic citizenry, it would seem that gay
Americans merit full respect. Sandel recognized this apparent triumph of
liberal toleration: Under Rawls’ vision, those “who consider
homosexuality immoral and therefore unworthy of the privacy rights
accorded heterosexual intimacy could not legitimately voice their views in
52
public debate.” After all, those “beliefs reflect comprehensive moral and
religious convictions and so may not play a part in political discourse about
53
matters of justice.” If anti-sodomy laws, for example, are primarily
justified on religious or moral grounds, they could not survive in a world
54
governed by Rawlsian liberal toleration. Similarly, bans on same-sex

50. In Snyder, the Court noted that the “‘content’ of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad
issues of interest to society at large” and “[w]hile these messages may fall short of refined social or
political commentary, . . . Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at
a public place adjacent to a public street. Such space occupies a ‘special position in terms of First
Amendment protection.’” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216–18 (2011).
51. In his concurring opinion in Speiser v. Randall’s companion case, Justice Black stated that
[l]oyalty oaths, as well as other contemporary “security measures,” tend to stifle all forms of
unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression—the kind of thought and expression which
has played such a vital and beneficial role in the history of this Nation. The result is a
stultifying conformity which in the end may well turn out to be more destructive to our free
society than foreign agents could ever hope to be.
First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. Cnty. of L.A, 357 U.S. 513, 532 (Black, J., concurring).
52. Michael J. Sandel, Book Review: Political Liberalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1790 (1994)
[hereinafter Sandel, Book Review].
53. Id.
54. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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marriage could never be grounded on a supposed Biblical prohibition
because that comprehensive religious dogma would not belong in Rawls’
political world.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Rawls’ remarkable work has
spawned so many progressive admirers and adherents. His admonition to
“leave your religion at the door” is common, in various formulations,
56
57
among liberal politicians and progressive legal arguments. It even is
found in liberal Christian arguments in favor of ending marriage
58
discrimination. Additionally, the restrictions that liberal toleration places
on public discourse seem understandably appealing to gays and lesbians.
As Carlos Ball noted, if the core of conservative arguments against gay
equality is a comprehensive religious or moral doctrine, a political
philosophy that excludes that doctrine from the public sphere would strip
59
conservatives of their strongest weapon. Absent appeals to tradition or
Judeo-Christian morality, the gay rights debate would be “conducted
with the understanding that freedom, equality, and toleration (all neutral
political values within a Rawlsian framework) are the only permissible
60
values . . . in a public discourse.”
This has largely been the context in which marriage advocates have
made their arguments. The movement’s preferred term, “marriage

55. See, e.g., Genesis 19 (the destruction of Sodom and Gommorah); Leviticus 18:22 (“Thou shalt
not lie with mankind, as with womankind, it is abomination.”); Leviticus 20:13 (“If a man also lie with
mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be
put to death; their blood shall be upon them.”); Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians 6:9 (“Don’t be
under any illusion—neither the impure, the idolater or the adulterer; neither the effeminate, the
pervert or the thief; neither the swindler, the drunkard, the foul-mouthed or the rapacious shall have
any share in the kingdom of God.”); Letter to the Romans 1:26–27 (“For this reason, God gave them
up to vile passions. For their women changed the natural function into that which is against nature.
Likewise also the men, leaving the natural function of the woman, burned in their lust toward one
another, men doing what is inappropriate with men, and receiving in themselves the due penalty of
their error.”). But see Lee Jefferson, What Does the Bible Actually Say About Gay Marriage, The
Huffington Post (June 29, 2011, 8:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-jefferson/bible-gaymarriage_b_886102.html.
56. See, e.g., Press Conference, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (June 7, 2012), transcript available at
http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2012/06/transcript-of-pelosi-press-conference-today-17.shtml
(responding to a question about her opposition to a Catholic institution lawsuit challenging the Obama
Administration’s contraception provision requirement in health insurance plans and stating, “I do my
religion on Sunday in Church and I try to go other days of the week. I don’t do it at this press
conference.”).
57. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (“Our obligation is
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”).
58. See, e.g., Mark Osler, My Take: The Christian Case for Gay Marriage, CNN Belief Blog
(May 19, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/19/my-take-the-christian-case-for-gaymarriage (“It is not our place, it seems, to sort out who should be denied a bond with God and the
Holy Spirit of the kind that we find through baptism, communion, and marriage. The water will flow
where it will.”).
59. Ball, supra note 28, at 1891.
60. Id.
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equality,” evokes the Rawlsian concept of liberal toleration and his
principles of justice, liberty, and equality and holds fast to the attendant
61
language of autonomy, freedom, and rights. As intellectual descendants
of Kant, liberals are comfortable in the language of autonomy and rights,
the freedom from oppression, and the right to follow their own path,
whatever that may be. Gay rights groups routinely (and rightly) criticize
Biblical morality as having no place in a discussion of civil marriage, and
62
marriage supporters are quick to consider marriage a civil right. “For
me,” the popular progressive refrain goes, “it all comes down to equality.”
In fact, nearly every organization dedicated to advancing the cause of
same-sex marriage speaks of a simple desire for equal treatment for gay
63
persons who want to marry the ones they love.
It seems like apostasy to argue against liberal toleration, especially
when it comes to gay rights. After all, the enemies of the gay rights
movement are intolerant, seeking as they do to impose a single,
comprehensive dogma on society as a whole. And yet, liberal toleration
cannot offer a complete basis for a successful legal argument for marriage
recognition. This Part will discuss three problems with Rawlsian toleration
as a basis for arguing for a right to marriage. The first—what I call the
Social Problem—is a sociological objection to the flat, morally empty
conception of liberal toleration, which requires us to ignore core
identifying characteristics about ourselves and puts out of reach empirical
arguments that could advance gay rights. The second problem—what I call
the Identity Problem—is specific to the role of sexual orientation in liberal
toleration and argues that bracketing away social and cultural
encumbrances—in order to leave only political values in the political
sphere—is possible only when your social and cultural identity is not a
political identity as well. That duality is not possible for most gay persons.
Finally, the third problem—what I call the Legal Problem—will weave in
arguments about the sociology of marriage and identity to show how the

61. See generally Sandel, Democracy, supra note 39. In particular, Professor Sandel argues that
the language of Rawlsian liberalism is necessary neo-Kantian and morally neutral: Citizens possess
liberty, freedom, and rights and are free to choose their own version of the good life by a government
that is neutral among ends. See id. at 3–54; Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection 96
(2007); see also Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers 13 (2001) (“Rights language offers a rich
vernacular for the claims an individual may make on or against the collectivity, but it is relatively
impoverished as a means of expressing individuals’ needs for the collectivity.”). The language of
liberalism is comfortable expressing community mostly through groups of individuals who are
possessors of rights. But, as Professor Ignatieff notes, “we are more than rights-bearing creatures, and
there is more to respect in a person than his rights.” Ignatieff, supra, at 13.
62. See, e.g., NAACP Backs Gay Marriage as a Civil Right, The Guardian (May 20, 2012, 8:16
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/20/naacp-gay-marriage-civil-right (“Civil marriage is
a civil right and a matter of civil law. The NAACP’s support for marriage equality is deeply rooted in
the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution and equal protection of all people.”).
63. See, e.g., About Us, Freedom to Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/about-us (last
visited Mar. 15, 2013)
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current constitutional case for the freedom to marry already reflects the
limits of liberal toleration. I argue that Rawls’ liberal toleration can only
take us partway through the legal argument for ending marriage
discrimination and recognizing a right to marry because those arguments
require us to affirm the social value of gay relationships.
1. The Social Problem
a.

A Narrative Conception of the Self

Rawls may have created a liberating vision of politics, where the
political self is an unfettered agent of choice that is free from the nasty
prejudices of everyday life. But the detached political self that is necessary
for liberal toleration fails to describe who we are, what we want, and what
64
our society should look like. It is not clear that it is either possible or
65
desirable to approach the public sphere without reference to who we are.
The liberal political self’s detachment from much of the physical world
may make her truly free in the deontological ethic, but it strips her of all
sorts of external ties that help define her. We are not simply atoms
66
roaming the void, disinterested in others around us, as Rawls would have
us believe; rather, we are sons or daughters, Jews or Christians, gay or
straight, lovers of basketball or opera. We are, according to Alistair
MacIntyre, part of a narrative of life that started before us and that will
67
end after us. Our ends are not fixed or laid out for us before we are born
68
by some oppressive governor out of George Orwell’s 1984 or the movie
69
Gattaca, but rather, “like characters in a fictional narrative we do not
know what will happen next, but nonetheless our lives have a certain form
70
which projects itself towards our future.” In other words, our choices and
our histories are not detached from who we are: They express who we are.
Phenomenological thinkers would agree. Merleau-Ponty—whose
famous Phenomenology of Perception rejected the Kantian ideal that truth
can only be ascertained through complete detachment from everyday life
71
into what Kant called the noumenal, or intelligible, realm —argued that
the only way to comprehend reality is through our bodies, the only

64. I make a similar argument in the context of online free speech, stating that the detaching
Kantian and Rawlsian self, though remarkably similar to the “ideal” and utterly autonomous virtual
self, cannot hope to address the substantive problems of Internet speech. See Waldman, supra note 37.
65. Much of this discussion is indebted to the work of Michael J. Sandel. See Sandel, Democracy,
supra note 39, at 3–24.
66. Sandel, Liberalism, supra note 37, at 54.
67. Alistair MacIntyre, After Virtue 201 (1981).
68. George Orwell, 1984 (1961).
69. Gattaca (Sony Pictures 1997).
70. MacIntyre, supra note 67, at 201.
71. Kant’s noumenal realm is a metaphysical place of pure reason, where man can separate and
be free from the base inclinations that hold him back in everyday life. See Kant, supra note 14.
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72

physical and observable means we have. Real experiences mediate our
conceptions of the world around us; without them, the world is
73
meaningless to us. “The world is not an object such that I have in my
possession the law of its making,” Merlau-Ponty wrote; rather, “it is the
natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit
perceptions. . . . [T]here is no inner man, man is the world, and only in
74
the world does he know himself.” In other words, meaning arises from
interactions with the world; meaning is, therefore, experiential. It follows
that any framework of laws that denies the experiential nature of
everyday life could never agree on an overlapping consensus.
Consider, for example, the manner in which progressive social
movements throughout history have influenced what we think of as the
settled background of everyday political life. Before unskilled workers
organized, marched, and called our attention to their lot in life, few leaders
spoke of a minimum wage or unemployment insurance. Only after women
engaged in political resistance to highlight gender discrimination in voting,
employment, and property, for example, did the inherent equality of
women become part of the background consensus of the modern state.
Kerry Whiteside made this point succinctly:
If today we believe it reasonable . . . that workers attain more than a
marginal economic existence or if we find racism detestable, it is
because people struggled, through strikes and protest and violence, to
vindicate those claims. That is to imply that concrete events, not just
75
abstract reasoning . . . are responsible for constituting what is rational.

Excluding that experiential knowledge and the particular social views
that come with it, as liberal toleration requires, would be particularly
damaging to the gay rights movement. Analyses of changing public
opinion on gay rights issues—from employment discrimination protections
and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” to adoption and marriage—suggest that the
single most important factor that wins over the vast moderate middle
toward gay acceptance is having a gay friend, having a family member who
76
is gay, or living alongside a gay person or family. In fact, studies show a
direct relationship between the type of experience with a gay person and
the shift on a gay political issue. For example, political positions on “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” changed after Americans saw examples of exceedingly

72. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Ted Honderich ed., Colin Smith
trans., 1962).
73. Id.
74. Id. at xi.
75. Kerry H. Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an Existential Politics 98
(1988).
76. Damla Ergun, Strong Support for Gay Marriage Now Exceeds Strong Opposition, ABC News
(May 23, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/05/strong-support-for-gay-marriage-nowexceeds-strong-opposition.
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brave gay service members risking their lives for their country. The
prominence of the gay impact litigation plaintiff who tells his or her
stories of service (in the military) or love (of the person he or she wants
to marry) likely adds to that learned experience.
Liberal toleration would force us to deny the impact of experiential
knowledge, leaving us with an empty politics. As Anne Dailey has noted,
this makes little sense from the perspective of identity politics: “Liberal
toleration implies critical distance; when I tolerate the actions of another,
78
I leave him alone.” But feminist identity politics, not to mention the
identity politics of other thickly constituted minorities, is
built upon narrative [that] can replace the critical distance of “empty
tolerance” with empathetic understanding. This renewed feminist
politics should demand more than our passive endurance of others’
differences; it should ask us to engage with others by actively seeking
to understand
those differences in a way that resonates with our own
79
experience.

We cannot expect to create the democracy we want when the conception
of the self that underlies it is not only too thin, but also incapable of
understanding the unique narratives that minority groups bring to a
pluralistic society. In this way, Rawls’ attempt to keep politics out of the
emotional disagreements inevitable in diverse democracies instead makes
it impossible for diversity to exist in the first place.
In place of the “emptiness” of liberal toleration as a concept of justice
and the detached political self upon which it is based, so-called
communitarian thinkers offer a robust politics of the narrative that is based
on an entirely different conception of the self. This vision thinks about
justice differently, as both teleological—determining the telos, or purpose,
of a thing or institution—and honorific—determining what values and
80
virtues the thing or institution should honor or reward. It asks us to dive
into questions of the good and answer them based on an encumbered
vision of who we are, very much in line with the theories of Sandel,
81
Dailey, and Merleau-Ponty. For Aristotle, justice is about the honors of

77. Lymari Morales, In U.S., 67% Support Repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Gallup Politics
(Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145130/support-repealing-dont-ask-dont-tell.aspx.
78. Anne C. Dailey, Feminism’s Return to Liberalism, 102 Yale L.J. 1265, 1283 (1993) (footnote
omitted).
79. Id. (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law & Gender 181, 197 (Katharine
T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (referring to “empty tolerance”)).
80. Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 186 (2009) [hereinafter
Sandel, Justice].
81. In addition to Professor Sandel, there are several thinkers whose critiques of Rawls and
liberalism are based, at least in part, on an Aristotelian foundation. See generally Alasdair
MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 344–45 (1988) (arguing that liberal neutrality and
toleration conceal the fact that liberalism is based on a “particular conception of the good life” and is
therefore one tradition among others without any necessary moral claim to priority); Michael
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society and how the government distributes them, and so the polis should
distribute a given honor on the basis of merit—not because everyone
deserves to be treated equally, but because giving a flute to the best flautist
82
will benefit her and society as a whole. Similarly, if the government is
going to mete out marriage licenses, it should do so after determining the
purposes of civil marriage and whether licensing this particular union
would realize those purposes.
Of course, a Rawlsian liberal could respond that (a) marriage has
various purposes, or (b) a pluralistic society could never agree about the
purposes of marriage. Therefore, liberal toleration requires that the state
treat all marriages equally. There are two problems with this argument:
First, it either requires the state to sanction every conceivable union that
its citizens consider a marriage, including unions with multiple wives, or
get out of the business of marriage altogether. Although neither of those
extremes are part of the mainstream debate over the freedom to marry,
liberal toleration’s equality mandate, coupled with its denial of value
judgment and moral debate, requires this all-or-nothing approach. Second,
my point is not that everyone has to agree that the institution of marriage
has a single set of purposes or contributes to an immutable list of social
goods; rather, I argue that in order to determine if a purpose of marriage
is realized by the denial of licenses to same-sex couples, we must dive
into the social consequences of marriage. As anyone familiar with the
constitutional case for ending marriage discrimination should know, our
current law already does this: by judging the legitimacy and rationality of
state interests in discriminating, determining the fundamental nature of
83
due process rights, and justifying the importance of the marriage right.
This suggests that liberal toleration is an insufficient tool to win the
constitutional case for marriage recognition.
Even Rawls questioned the capacity of liberal toleration to address
gay rights. In Political Liberalism, he admitted that to “resolve . . .
particular and detailed issues it is often more reasonable to go beyond the
political conception [of the self] and the values its principles express, and

Walzer, What It Means to Be an American 30 (1996) (stating that citizenship in the liberal world
requires commitment only to the abstract ideals of “liberty, equality and republicanism”); Michael J.
Sandel, Religious Liberty: Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, 3 Utah L. Rev. 597 (1989);
Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in Secularism and Its Critics 31, 36–37 (Rajeev Bhargava ed.,
1998) (arguing that freedom of religion “understandably comes across as the imposition of one
metaphysical view over others, and an alien one at that”); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition,
in Charles Taylor et al., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 25, 37–39
(Amy Gutman ed., 1994) (“[T]he development of the modern notion of identity[] has given rise to a
politics of difference.”). For a general discussion of this basic disagreement, see Stephen Mulhall &
Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (1992); Sandel, Democracy, supra note 39, at 3–53, 317–51.
82. That is Professor Sandel’s example. See Sandel, Justice, supra note 80, at 187–88.
83. See infra Part II.
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to invoke nonpolitical values that such a view does not include.” Political
liberalism, then, is meant to deal with the central problems of modern
society: speech and religious freedom, property rights, equality of
85
opportunity, freedom of movement, and the rule of law, for example. But
these are relatively easy questions. The liberal societies Rawls looked to
when he wrote Political Liberalism all share a long tradition of protection
for basic rights and freedoms. After all, Rawls’ work was an overt
attempt to observe modern democracies as they exist and provide a
philosophical foundation for their success. For Rawls, liberal toleration is
supposed to provide a framework for establishing these basic rules of
justice; from those debates should flow the tools to answer more specific
86
questions of rights and freedoms. That concession, however, is poised to
swallow Rawls’ entire endeavor. If the real hot button political debates
of the day cannot be answered by liberal toleration, it can hardly be seen
as a governing framework for a well-ordered society. And as I argue
below, while it may be possible for many people to consider even basic
questions of liberty, property, and opportunity without reference to
87
identity, most gay persons cannot.
b.

The Sociology of Marriage

But the above discussion is all theoretical. McIntyre, Dailey, and
Merleau-Ponty may help elucidate the emptiness and insufficiency of the
liberal approach, but narrative and experiential political theory cannot
affirmatively answer the constitutional question of the legitimacy of
marriage discrimination any more than liberal toleration. To win the
freedom to marry, the Constitution asks us to explain why marriage
discrimination is not rationally related to any legitimate government
88
89
interest. Those interests—fostering stability, child rearing, parenting —
are social facts, not legal ones. Durkheim’s analysis of sociology, social
facts, and marriage, therefore, can help fill the void left by liberalism by

84. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 21, at 230.
85. Ball, supra note 28, at 1892 (quoting Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 21, at xxvii).
86. Id. (quoting Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 21, at xxix).
87. See infra Part I.B.2.
88. Even though the level of scrutiny appropriate for state action that discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation is up for debate, see, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682
F.3d 1, 9–11 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that rational basis review should apply, but a form of rational
basis stronger than that applied to economic legislation); Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.
2d 968, 982–91 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that heightened scrutiny should apply), I use the standard
formula for rational basis review because it is the current standard and for ease of use. My analysis would
not change if the federal courts adopted heightened scrutiny, because each level of scrutiny requires an
understanding of the social importance of marriage. The differences are legal, not sociological.
89. According to opponents of the freedom to marry, these are some of the standard
governmental interests supposedly fostered by not allowing gay persons to marry. See, e.g., DefendantIntervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 75–113, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.
2012) (No. 10-16696).
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allowing us to see marriage as an important institution and to avail
ourselves of real, empirical arguments about the social effects of
marriage and the illegitimacy of marriage discrimination. Sociology
offers more than MacIntyre’s theoretical conception of interconnected
narrative; it offers proof of it. We shall see that not only does the
constitutional case for ending marriage discrimination depend on proof,
it depends on precisely the kind of proof in Durkheim’s sociological
vision.
Durkheim saw marriage as much more than just a contract between
90
individuals, as a liberal might. For him, the “union of two spouses” was
“an intimate association, one that is lasting, often even indissoluble,
91
between two lives throughout their whole existence.” The institution
creates “solidarity” between spouses: marriage is an “expression of an
internal and deeper condition” that brings together “two beings [who] are
92
mutually dependent upon each other because they are both incomplete.”
Family and domestic law reflect the social norms, customs, and roles
93
marriage plays in society. Marriage, therefore, is a social bargain among
94
two spouses and the state, where the spouses work together, fulfill each
95
other’s emotional and practical needs, and enrich each other’s lives. At
96
the same time, state law reflects the social norms of marriage and the
97
social fabric of society—what Durkheim called “solidarity” —is
enhanced through the transformational effects of the institution of
marriage. Olson echoed Durkheim when he argued that marriage is
a stable bond between two individuals who work to create a loving
household and a social and economic partnership. We encourage
couples to marry because the commitments they make to one another
provide benefits not only to themselves but also to their families and
communities. Marriage requires thinking beyond one’s own needs. It
transforms two individuals into a union based on shared aspirations,
and in doing so establishes a formal investment in the well-being of
98
society.

90. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 950–56 (1979); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of
Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 204 (1982); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory
Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 397 (1992); Gregg Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate
Relationships, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 121 (1985); Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting Responsibility Back
into Marriage: Making a Case for Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1223 (1993).
91. Durkheim, Sociological Method, supra note 27, at 20.
92. Id. at 22. Here, Durkheim was referring to any kind of mutually dependent institution of the
division of labor in society. Marriage was his case study.
93. Id. at 78.
94. Id. at 155.
95. Id. at 20–23.
96. Id. at 78.
97. Id. at 17.
98. Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, Newsweek (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/08/the-conservative-case-for-gay-marriage.html.
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The Supreme Court also channeled Durkheim’s social view of marriage in
99
several cases, including Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice Brennan
called marriage “an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths . . . . Yet it is an association for as
100
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”
Marriage, then, is socially important, playing an essential role in the
creation of social solidarity. It is a prototypical “social fact” that is
exogenous, external, and prior to the individual and that coerces or
101
mediates him in some way. Belief is a social fact, as are the law,
sisterhood, religion, customary practices, and even lasting phenomena like
traffic jams: We did not create them, but rather entered into a world in
which they exist. We do not control them, but rather they mediate us into
acting a certain way. They are “the beliefs, tendencies and practices of
102
the group taken collectively.” The institution of marriage is a social fact
because it existed as an institution prior to its current participants and it
uses the social norms with which it has been encumbered over the years
to coerce social behavior outside its bonds (social norms encourage
people to marry and to hold the institution in some degree of esteem)
and inside its limits (norms within marriage define anything from the
impropriety of adultery to the importance of showing love and affection
to the need to live together). And as a social fact, marriage can only be
studied by reference to its real, empirical effects on society. This is the
role of the sociologist, who cannot “observe [a social fact] in its pure
state,” but only with reference to the effects that norm or institution has
103
on society as a whole. In the case of marriage, for example, a
sociologist would study marriage by qualitatively and quantitatively
studying its effects on society: from its association with patriotism to its
effects on raising children, from the way it alters our social interactions
and social networks to its impact on happiness, education, or income.
This kind of analysis is both beyond the liberal language of rights
and yet also an essential part of the constitutional case for the freedom to
marry. Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence requires that proponents of
a law or state action that draws lines between groups of citizens justify that
discrimination as a valid exercise of government power. In the case of the
freedom to marry, opponents have to pass a “more searching form of
rational basis review” that requires them to argue that society benefits

99. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100. Id. at 486.
101. Durkheim, Division of Labor, supra note 27, at 50–51.
102. Id. at 54. This makes sense coming from the founder of sociology whose goal in The Rules of
Sociological Method and elsewhere was to establish the study of social phenomena as a rigorous
science distinct from psychology and as necessary as biology.
103. Id. at 55; Durkheim, Sociological Method, supra note 27, at 27.
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from keeping gay persons out of the institution of marriage. They argue
that marriage discrimination encourages “optimal parenting” structures
for raising children, preserves meaningful traditions, or helps raise the
105
Conversely, proponents of marriage
most well-adjusted children.
freedom argue that allowing gay persons to marry contributes the same
106
social benefit as opposite-sex marriages. This makes Durkheim’s
sociology of marriage a necessary piece in the constitutional puzzle.
2. The Identity Problem
The political self in Political Liberalism has no gender or sexual
orientation (nor a religion, cultural baggage, or a history of social status for
that matter), so she cannot bring to bear the unique perspectives of her
sexual identity on matters of justice. But bracketing away those personal
ties and identities that could only complicate and prejudice decisions in the
political sphere is perfectly fine for those whose identities have little to no
political impact for them. That may be the case for most heterosexuals for
107
whom, as the presumed majority, society is structured, but it is not true
for most gay and lesbian Americans. Gay identity is political, especially
when it comes to marriage, and any system of justice that denies gay
persons the opportunity to participate in public life as gay persons forces
them into a political closet.
108
Nan Hunter has argued that gay identity is a political identity. She
maintains that the “idea of identity is more complicated and unstable than
either simply status or conduct,” that is, being gay or doing “gay” things:
“It encompasses explanation and representation of the self. Selfrepresentation of one’s sexual identity necessarily includes a message that
one has not merely come out, but that one intends to be out—to act on and
109
live out that identity.” For many gay Americans, that means engaging in
political life to change those institutions that discriminate against them qua
gay Americans. Identifying themselves as gay Americans is an essential
part of that story, so much so that coming out is political. Therefore, the
Rawlsian political self upon which liberal toleration is based is
problematic for gay persons.
Several academics have addressed the political nature of gay
110
identity; it is a long and learned scholarship that need not be repeated

104. See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2010).
105. See generally Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 89.
106. See generally Brief for Respondents, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2013).
107. Ball, supra note 28, at 1890.
108. See Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1695 (1993).
109. Id. at 1696.
110. See, e.g., id. The theory also applies to the political nature of the identify of racial minorities.
See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment
Right of Association, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1209 (2003).
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here. As a matter of law, the concept is easiest to understand in the context
of coming out speech and the fight against various forms of retaliation for
111
112
manifesting or being “open and notorious” about one’s sexuality.
The First Circuit recognized gay identity as political in Gay Students
113
Organization of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner. That case
erupted when the university denied permission for the Gay Students
114
Association (“GSO”) to hold a social gathering after a play on campus.
Dr. Bonner, the university’s president, condemned the event, which went
ahead anyway, and criticized the distribution of what the then-governor
115
called “‘extremist’ homosexual publications.” The First Circuit sided
with the GSO and criticized the university for trying to violate both the
116
associative and communicative rights of the group. The GSO was not
merely a social group: It was a group organized around a particular
political cause—the inclusion of gays in society—and the university
burdened the group’s communicative rights when it refused to approve
117
of the GSO’s particular means of voicing its message. Accordingly, the
GSO’s communicative content brought it under the orbit of the First
118
Amendment’s protection for expressive political conduct. The court
held that GSO events carried the same underlying “message”: “that
homosexuals exist, that they feel repressed by existing laws and attitudes,
that they wish to emerge from their isolation, and that public
119
understanding of their attitudes and problems is desirable for society.”
Any speech or expressive conduct that conveys that message is political,
not personal or sexual. In order for gay persons to fully participate in the
political sphere, therefore, their identity must come with them; in fact,
their identity is inextricably tied to their political participation unless they
force themselves into a closet. The forced denial of a political identity
hardly sounds like a goal of liberal toleration, but it seems like the natural
111. Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 596 (Cal. 1979).
112. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
113. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
114. Id. at 654.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 659–61; see id. at 659 (calling the GSO a “cause-oriented group”); id. at 660 (“The
GSO’s efforts to organize the homosexual minority, ‘educate’ the public as to its plight, and obtain for
it better treatment from individuals and from the government thus represent but another example of
the associational activity unequivocally singled out for protection in the very ‘core’ of association cases
decided by the Supreme Court.” (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937))).
117. Id. at 661 (“[President Bonner and the University administrators] relied heavily on their
obligation and right to prevent activities which the people of New Hampshire find shocking and
offensive.”).
118. Id. at 660–61.
119. Id. at 661; see id. at 654 n.1 (“[The group’s] ‘primary purpose . . . is to promote the recognition
of gay people on campus and to form a viable organization through which bisexual and homosexual
people may express themselves.”).
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result of Rawls’ insistence on bracketing those personal and community
ties that separate us from an overlapping consensus of justice.
This gay-identity-as-political-identity story developed further in 1978
with California’s Briggs Initiative. The Initiative would have allowed any
school to fire an employee who engaged in the “advocating, soliciting,
imposing, encouraging or promoting of private or public homosexual
activity directed at, or likely to come to the attention of, schoolchildren
120
and/or other employees.” Hunter argued that this merged viewpoint
and status discrimination: The Initiative would certainly reach any gay or
lesbian teacher who came out in any public way, but it could also stretch to
any heterosexual ally who happened to attend a gay rights rally or speak of
homosexuality approvingly. The result of that merger was “the formation
121
of a legal construct of identity” that is unique to gay persons. Granted,
the law could have let a school fire heterosexuals, but, as contemporary
news reports prove, it was widely considered a way to purge gay teachers
122
from the public schools.
123
The Initiative failed, but the campaign represented “the moment
when American politics began to treat homosexuality as something more
than deviance, conduct, or lifestyle; it marked the emergence of
124
homosexuality as an openly political claim and as a viewpoint.” In other
words, it introduced gay identity into the political sphere: Being gay and
coming out as such were more than just proxies for sexual conduct, they
were ideas and identities in their own right, deserving of space in the
marketplace of political ideas.
One year later, the California Supreme Court agreed, stating that
employees could not be fired simply for coming out. In Gay Law Students
125
Ass’n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the court affirmed that
identity speech is political speech for gay persons: An employer could not
target those who made “an issue of their homosexuality” because that
would be tantamount to forcing those employees to “refrain from adopting
126
[a] particular course or line of political . . . activity.” Any other holding
would make it impossible not only for anyone to ever come out, but also
for the community to gather and fight for its rights in the public arena:
[T]he struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights,
particularly in the field of employment, must be recognized as a
political activity. . . . [O]ne important aspect of the struggle for equal

120. Cal. Proposition 6 § 3(b)(2) (1978).
121. Hunter, supra note 108, at 1703.
122. Id. (citing Randy Shilts, The Mayor of Castro Street: The Life and Times of Harvey Milk
212–51 (1982); Witch-Hunting, The Economist, Oct. 28, 1978, at 50).
123. Hunter, supra note 108, at 1704 (citing Victory in California, Seattle; Miami Defeat, The
Advocate, Dec. 13, 1978, at 9).
124. Hunter, supra note 108, at 1704.
125. Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610–11 (Cal. 1979).
126. Id. at 611 (alterations in original).

762

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:739

rights is to induce homosexual individuals to “come out of the closet,”
acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to associate with others in
127
working for equal rights.

Coming out as gay was, therefore, essential to political participation,
not an exogenous burden of personhood that had no place in a tolerant
public sphere. This acknowledgment of a political identity for gay persons
so bound up with their personal sexual identity not only subsumed coming
out speech under the First Amendment, but it also recognized the essential
role a gay person’s sexual identity has on his political participation. A
purely Rawlsian view of the political realm cannot account for the merger
of personal and political identities unique to gay persons.
Like Bonner and Gay Law Students, National Gay Task Force v.
128
Board of Education also recognized that gay persons could not hope to
participate in public life and advance their interests without bringing
their open identity along with them. The Task Force challenged an
Oklahoma law similar to the Briggs Initiative that banned all teachers
from engaging in “public homosexual activity” and “public homosexual
129
conduct.” “Activity” included non-private sexual acts, while “conduct”
included “advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting
public or private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial
risk that such conduct [would] come to the attention of school children or
130
school employees.” The Tenth Circuit held that the “conduct” section
was overbroad: “The First Amendment protects ‘advocacy,’” the court
noted, and any statute that would seek to punish a teacher for appearing
before the state legislature to advocate for greater gay rights is necessarily
131
unconstitutionally overbroad. Those statements—identifying yourself as
gay, as a victim of official discrimination, and advocating for the repeal of
anti-sodomy laws or discriminatory workplace rules, for example—“are
aimed at legal and social change, [and] are at the core of First
132
Amendment protections.” Gay identity and gay rights are, therefore,
political matters, covered by the “core” of the First Amendment because
they are matters of great public concern. For the liberal toleration of
Rawls’ political liberalism to demand an artificial separation of gay
identity from the political sphere would neuter efforts to make positive
social change on behalf of gay Americans.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 610.
Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273–75 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1272 (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (1984)).
Id.
Id. at 1274 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)).
Id.
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3. The Legal Problem
Leaving sexual identity and the capacity for moral judgment at the
political door not only makes it difficult to engage in politics as a gay
person, it also denies us very real and effective legal arguments that we
need to succeed in the quest for overturning bans on same-sex marriage
and winning marriage recognition. Sandel made the political core of this
argument before, but I would like to go further and show how liberal
toleration not only restricts effective arguments in the abstract, the analysis
133
for which I am indebted to Sandel, but also could never adequately jump
the substantive constitutional hurdles that currently lay before same-sex
marriage in the federal courts—namely, the nature of the supposedly
fundamental right to marry, the arguable illegitimacy of state interests to
discriminate, and the central importance of marriage in society.
When it comes to certain important social and political issues, Sandel
argued, the restrictions that liberal toleration places on the public sphere
take away the arguments progressives need to succeed. Conservative views
on abortion and gay rights are overtly and unapologetically morality
based. But if Christian teachings are correct that “abortion is morally
tantamount to murder, then it is not clear why the political values of
toleration and women’s equality, important though they are, should
134
prevail.” Similarly, if gay relationships are actually immoral, liberal
toleration may get us as far as leaving them alone; anti-sodomy laws, for
135
example, could fall under the liberal ethic. But, as Ball noted, it does not
follow that something viewed as immoral should be endorsed or supported
by the government through a marriage license and all its attendant
136
benefits.
Frank Michelman responds to this objection, arguing that there is a
robust legal interpretive arm to Rawlsian liberalism and liberal toleration
that is more than just an absence of antigay moralism. For Rawls,

133. See, e.g., Sandel, Democracy, supra note 39, at 103–08.
134. Sandel, Book Review, supra note 52, at 1778.
135. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[M]uch of
the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds.”); id. at 206 (arguing that the moral status of homosexuality
was not the issue; rather, the Constitution had to respect that “different individuals will make different
choices” when living their lives); id. at 218–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“From the standpoint of the
individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding how he will live his
own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary associations
with his companions.”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the
person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”).
136. Ball, supra note 28, at 1894.
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Michelman argues, liberalism must couple respect for liberty and equality
with an “expectation about how constitutionally guaranteed basic liberties
will have their meanings filled out in application,” or guiding principles of
interpretation that are consistent with the underlying principle of
137
toleration and respect for the individual. Michelman argues that this
fleshing out must create the preconditions that allow persons to fully
develop as citizens, exercise their moral powers, and participate and
138
cooperate in society. Liberalism, then, can eschew the nitty-gritty of the
value of marriage and the moral worth of gay relationships when
debating a constitutional right to marriage because the liberal ethic can
now say that the denial of this or that constitutional right unjustifiably
hinders the development and exercise of citizens’ capacity to fully
139
cooperate in society. Gay persons who cannot adopt, marry, or even
express their love in public are not simply the victims of illiberal
intolerance, but are also hindered from realizing their true substantive
140
equality as full members of a liberal society.
But although Michelman offers a more robust picture of liberal
141
toleration than the caricature implied by MacKinnon and Dailey, he
has not rescued liberalism from its central failing: its inability to address
substantive moral debate. Michelman does not challenge Sandel’s basic
thesis that liberalism denies the public sphere the tools to address moral

137. Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in The Cambridge
Companion to Rawls 410 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
138. Id. at 398–400, 410.
139. Id. at 411.
140. Professor Michelman quotes extensively from Justice Brennan’s opinion in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), to show an example of this robust liberalism in practice. Justice
Brennan’s use of the language of liberalism to talk about something as intimate and personal as
marriage, community, and love resembles Justices Blackmun’s, Stevens’, and Kennedy’s opinions on
anti-sodomy laws. See supra note 137. It is worth partially quoting here to show the power of
Michelman’s argument:
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure
individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by
the State. . . . Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference . . .
safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of
liberty.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19. Justice Brennan goes on to argue that family and intimate relationships
merit constitutional protection because they flow from the freedom of association inherent in the
liberal principle of liberty:
Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life. . . .
[R]elationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.
Id. at 619–20.
141. See Michelman, supra note 137 and accompanying text (referring to “empty tolerance”).
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questions of value, honor, and the good life. Indeed, he insists that the
language of liberalism is more robust and capable of addressing marriage,
142
what he calls an “Exemplary Case,” in purely liberal terms. Marriage
143
discrimination laws are unjustified hindrances to gay persons’ full
144
development in society. But it is still not clear how we are to determine,
from a constitutional perspective of liberal toleration, what makes a
particular hindrance unjustified. As I noted earlier, a conservative could
argue that abortion is morally wrong and homosexual relations are
abominations, so denying them social approval would be the right thing to
do to protect the individuals and society as a whole. Liberalism cannot
adequately respond to that odious value judgment when it denies itself
the tools of moral debate.
My critique of Michelman need not remain abstract. The very
standards of constitutional law that the current quest for marriage
recognition must overcome are all, in some form or another, proxies for
determining whether discrimination in favor of opposite-sex marriage is
justifiable. And in each case, the language and underlying philosophy of
liberal toleration only takes us part of the way. To be clear, I am not
arguing that liberalism is an enemy of gay rights or hostile to marriage
recognition for gays; rather, it is a necessary, but insufficient tool. At
some point, a successful legal case for marriage recognition must address
more than just liberty and equality and affirm the social good of gay
relationships.

II. Case Study: HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY and the Constitutional
Argument for Ending Marriage Discrimination
To illustrate this point, this Article uses the district and appellate
court decisions in Hollingsworth v. Perry as cases studies. As arguably the
145
most famous marriage case in the country, and certainly the most
146
successful, Perry offers a window into the substantive legal arguments
governing the quest for marriage at the federal level. In his broad decision,
Judge Vaughn Walker declared that Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”), California’s
constitutional marriage discrimination provision, violated both the Equal
147
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit
142. Michelman, supra note 137, at 410.
143. Id. at 411.
144. Id. at 412.
145. This is largely due to the litigation’s sponsor, the American Foundation for Equal Rights, and
its concerted media efforts, and the fame of the plaintiffs’ legal team, headed by often courtroom and
political adversaries Ted Olson and David Boies. Mr. Olson, a conservative, former George W. Bush
solicitor-general and a partner at Gibson Dunn L.L.P., has done much to bridge the gap between the
marriage movement and conservatives.
146. Perry is the first federal same-sex marriage case to reach a circuit court since Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), a state case, was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1972.
147. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

766

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:739

affirmed the result, but on narrower grounds, holding that the taking away
148
of rights effectuated by Prop 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause. In
both cases, the judges stepped outside the boundaries of liberal toleration
and wrestled with the social role of marriage to reach their conclusions.
First, though Judge Walker found that heightened scrutiny was appropriate,
both he and the Ninth Circuit worked through the rational basis review
standard to determine that Prop 8 was not rationally related to any
legitimate state interest. Their assessments of rationality and legitimacy
required them to judge the social value of gay relationships and the social
goods embodied by various state rationales. Second, when Judge Walker
found that bans on same-sex marriage violated a fundamental due
process right to marry, he was implicitly extending a long line of federal
cases to include same-sex unions. To do so required him to put those
unions on par with opposite-sex unions as contributors to the good life.
Third, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Romer v. Evans to find that Prop 8
unlawfully took away rights from gay Californians required Judge
Walker to step out of the language of neutral liberalism and elevate the
institution of marriage as an essential social good.
A. Legitimacy and Rationality Under Rational Basis Review
149

150

Despite the President’s and certain courts’ views of the proper
standard for reviewing state actions that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, the current convention retains some form of rational basis
151
review. This standard requires a state actor to justify any classification as

148. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
149. President Obama believes that laws like the Defense of Marriage Act should be reviewed under
heightened scrutiny. See Chris Geidner, DOJ Stops Defending DOMA Provision, MetroWeekly (Feb.
23, 2011), http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=6022.
150. See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985–91 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
Even Judge Walker concluded, in dictum, that strict scrutiny should apply to sexual orientation
discrimination. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (“[T]he evidence presented at trial shows that gays and
lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect.” (citations omitted)).
151. Recently, the Second Circuit held in Windsor v. United States, that heightened scrutiny should
be used to assess the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), in particular, and
of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, in general. 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012). The
First Circuit held in Massachusetts v. Department of Health and Human Services that a more searching
form of rational basis should be used. 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012). As of this writing, the Supreme
Court has granted a writ of certiorari in this case to make a final determination on DOMA. See United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (granting cert.). The Court may also clarify the appropriate
level of scrutiny. Students of constitutional law are readily familiar with the arguable difference
between traditional rational basis review and “rational basis plus” or “rational basis with bite.” Jeffrey
D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back Into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and
Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 491, 538 n.292 (2011) (describing
Romer and Cleburne as instances of an enhanced “rational basis with bite” test involving closer-thannormal scrutiny). Those particular distinctions are beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say
that both forms of rational basis review still require the state to justify the given classification as
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152

rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Rationality and
legitimacy are certainly not high hurdles to jump, but as the Supreme
Court regularly reminds us, rational basis review is not a license for judges
to abrogate their responsibility to determine the constitutionality of state
153
action. And in the context of marriage discrimination, determining what
is rational and what is legitimate is another way of asking if excluding gays
from marriage is justifiable. Answering that question goes beyond the
language of liberal toleration.
At the district court, the proponents of Prop 8 offered several
rationales for the state to discriminate against gay couples: (1) adhering to
tradition, (2) proceeding with caution on a matter of great social change
and significance, (3) promoting so-called “optimal” parenting through
opposite-sex parents, (4) protecting the freedom of those who oppose the
freedom to marry, (5) recognizing that same-sex couples are different from
154
opposite-sex couples, and (6) a catchall. To respond to these purported
state interests, Judge Walker combined liberal neutrality with a more
robust social experientialism.
Note how the very notion of a purported state interest that is
sufficient to justify discrimination already defies strict liberal toleration
and takes us into the realm of Durkheim, sociology, and experience.
Under either Rawls’ “justice as fairness” or “political liberalism,” none of
these interests make sense. Justice as fairness requires any deviation from
equality to benefit society as a whole and, in particular, the most
disadvantaged. All these aforementioned interests (save the catchall)
would fail that requirement immediately. Nor do arguments about
tradition, caution, and optimal parenting belong in the political sphere;
they are based on comprehensive dogmas and a priori value judgments
that should be bracketed away when debating public matters. The very
idea that state interests could exist beyond the scope of political
liberalism suggests that liberal toleration is, without more, an insufficient
tool of constitutional argument.
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. For a thoughtful analysis on “rational basis with
bite” and how it is far from equivalent to heightened scrutiny, see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 761–62 (2011); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law:
Principles and Policies 673 (3d ed. 2006). This Article’s argument—that the justification inherent in the
constitutional case for the freedom to marry requires that we move beyond liberalism to the sociology of
marriage—holds regardless of the level of scrutiny. If the Court affirms heightened scrutiny, reaching the
higher “important” hurdle would still require reference to the social good of marriage.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1938).
153. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection
case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the
classification adopted and the object to be attained. The search for the link between classification and
objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides guidance and discipline for the
legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limits of our own
authority.”).
154. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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Judge Walker and the Ninth Circuit found the Prop 8 proponents’
purported state interests not rationally related to the underlying law at
155
issue. The lion’s share of the proponents’ arguments was that California
had a supposed interest in promoting what proponents called “optimal”
156
opposite-sex parenting. As is evident from both the district court and the
appellate court decision, the most effective response relied, in part, on the
rhetoric and philosophy of liberal toleration, but only succeeded by going
beyond it. If marriage discrimination apparently promoted “naturally
procreative relationships” and allowed children to be raised by their
157
biological parents in stable households, then the best response would be
to show that gay parents are actually great parents and capable of
benefiting children, themselves, and society, rather than simply saying
that gay parents should be treated as equal to heterosexual parents in the
158
abstract. That is precisely what Judge Walker did.
It would have been easy enough to state that Prop 8 has nothing to
do with children, especially since all it does is deny gay couples the word
“marriage” but leaves intact California’s family law rules that allow gay
159
persons to adopt and raise children. But Judge Walker cited evidence
offered at trial that speaks to the experience of marriage, not just legal
principles. What affects a child’s wellbeing is not the genders of her
parents, but “the quality of [her] relationship with . . . her parents,” the
quality of her relationships with “significant adults in [her] life,” and the
160
availability of resources. Plaintiffs also showed that children raised in
lesbian or gay homes are “as likely as children raised by heterosexual
161
parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted.” The Ninth Circuit
stated that all evidence proves that “gay individuals are fully capable of . . .
162
responsibly caring for and raising children.” All of this helped prove that
gay parents are just as good as heterosexual parents, thus discounting the
legitimacy of any state interest in marriage discrimination based on some
notion of “optimal” parenting structures.
Continuing on to some of the other purported state interests only
buttresses the argument that experience and social values are necessary

155. Neither court had the occasion to assess the “legitimacy” of the particular rationales. That
determination would require more than just reliance on the language and substance of rights and force
the court to make a value judgment as to whether a state should have that interest.
156. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 999–1000.
159. Id. at 1000; Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012).
160. Transcript of Record at 1010:13–1011:13, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696).
161. Id. at 1014:25–1015:19, 1025:4–23, 1038:23–1040:17, 1040:22–1042:10, 1187:13–1189:6 (testimony
of Professor Michael Lamb, University of Cambridge, Department of Psychology); Plaintiff’s Exhibit
2565, 2547, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696) (peer psychological and sociological studies showing the
success of children of gay parents).
162. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1087 (alteration in original).
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addendums to liberal toleration arguments in the rational basis context.
Judge Walker did a courtroom two-step to use the rhetoric of liberalism
to make the argument that tradition alone cannot justify discrimination,
regardless of the historicity or length of that tradition. His citations to
163
164
Williams v. Illinois and Heller v. Doe for the proposition that the
ancient origin of discrimination does not necessarily make it rational were
technically accurate but misleading. Williams, a case about the
constitutionality of being sent to jail in default of payment of a fine, and
Heller, a case about discrimination against the mentally disabled, concede
that tradition does not equate with rationality, but both assert that the
“antiquity” of and “adherence” to a given practice should weigh heavily in
165
favor of its retention. Judge Walker declined to dive into that balancing
test because doing so would likely have required an assessment of the
social value of the institution itself. Instead, he equated Prop 8’s
marriage discrimination with the antiquated notion that individuals in
marriages fulfill specific gender roles and noted, without passing moral
166
judgment, that California has eliminated those gender-specific rules.
He also pointed to evidence offered at trial showing that marriage
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination: A man can marry a
woman, but not another man; a woman can marry a man, but not another
167
woman. Prop 8 treated the sexes differently in a world that believes the
sexes should be treated equally. Though successful, liberal toleration’s
respect for equality misses other reasons why this discriminatory tradition
should not be continued—namely, the social value of equal partnership
marriages. Those values are readily apparent from experience: increased
workforce productivity among women, a more educated populace, the
potential for lasting relationships among equals, and the ripple effects of
168
increased self-esteem and skill valuation, to name just a few. If Judge
Walker truly wanted to rebut the heavy presumption antiquity and

163. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
164. Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
165. Heller, 509 U.S. at 326 (“Ancient lineage of a legal concept does not give it immunity from
attack for lacking a rational basis. That the law has long treated the classes as distinct, however,
suggests that there is a commonsense distinction [between the classifications made by that law].”);
Williams, 399 U.S. at 239–40 (“While neither the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast
legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack,
these factors should be weighed in the balance.” (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664,
678 n.11 (1970) (“Nearly 50 years ago Mr. Justice Holmes stated: ‘If a thing has been practised for two
hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it.’”))); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
166. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
167. Id. at 973, 998.
168. The social benefits of sexual equality are beyond the scope of this Article. For a thoughtful
analysis on the social value of women’s equality, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law
and Gender (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
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adherence give to marriage discrimination, he may have needed more than
the admittedly important state interest in equality.
Notably, Durkheimiam scholars might argue that even though
Durkheim’s sociology is an essential part of the equal protection argument
on the freedom to marry, his theory of organic solidarity would have a
difficult time rejecting tradition as a legitimate social and governmental
interest for denying gay persons the freedom to marry. For Durkheim, law
reflects social norms and solidarity, which, collectively, represent the
169
aggregation of belief, traditions, customs, and laws built up over time.
Therefore, if long-standing tradition imbues marriage with an opposite sex
norm, it would seem difficult to argue against even from an empirical
sociological perspective.
The simple response to this canard is that nothing is immutable in the
evolving social structure in Durkheim’s world. Part of his argument in The
Division of Labor in Society was that the ever-improving social division of
labor is the engine that drives change in society over time, moving us from
the sameness of ancient clans and tribes to a modern professional and
170
complementary society full of diversity and interdependence. It stands to
reason, then, that as the division of labor within marriage changes, so
should the social norms and laws that define the marital bond.
Durkheim’s division of labor is not limited to the myopia of the
economic realm. Rather, it is broadly social: The natural instinct to “seek
in our friends those qualities we lack” moves us to unite in complementary
rather than identical social networks in all areas of life, including
171
marriage. So, in marriage, that instinct brings together complements, not
identical twins, thereby increasing “the productivity” and linking “them
172
very closely together.” Durkheim describes the history of marriage as
one of ever-increasing division of labor from ancient times, when marriage,
173
such as it was, meant little, to modern times, when laws detailed the
“duties relating to husband and wife, . . . divorce, nullity or separation
(including division of property), on the powers of the father, on the legal
174
consequences of adoption,” and so on. Domestic law, then, reflected the
175
division of labor within a marriage. But as the division of labor changes,

169. Durkheim, Sociological Method, supra note 27, at 24 (“[S]ocial solidarity is a wholly moral
phenomenon which by itself is not amenable to exact observation and especially not to measurement. To
arrive at this classification, . . . we must therefore substitute for this internal datum, which escapes us, an
external one which symbolizes it, and then study the former through the latter. That visible symbol is the
law.”).
170. Id. at 18–21.
171. Id. at 17.
172. Id. at 21.
173. Id. at 19–21, 155–56.
174. Id. at 78, 156–59.
175. Id. at 155 (“[D]omestic law, from being originally simple, has become increasingly complex,
that is, the different species of legal relationships that give rise to family life are much more numerous
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so should the law. After all, the division of labor created the intricate
domestic law of modern marriage and, therefore, it can certainly change it.
Nineteenth century French family law may have been patriarchal, but the
twenty-first century family is less defined by strict gender roles. Judge
176
Walker made this precise argument in his Perry decision. He knew that
177
women are entering the workforce at unprecedented levels while men
are increasingly staying home to raise children, cook meals, and pack
178
lunches. Durkheim would probably see the modern family as a product
of divorcing domestic division of labor from gender. Given that, the law
should change to reflect that change in social norms.
Prop 8 proponents also argued that the state has an interest in
proceeding with caution when making significant social change, a
purported interest that Judge Walker shot down by going beyond liberal
toleration. Letting gay persons into the institution was not sweeping social
change; rather, it would have “at least a neutral, if not a positive, effect on
the institution of marriage and that same-sex couples’ marriages would
179
benefit the state.” He did not mean monetarily. Referring to evidence
that ending marriage discrimination in Massachusetts had no ill effects
180
on the institution and on the state, Judge Walker took a sociological
perspective on marriage. That is, he looked beyond the admittedly
important principles of liberty and equality in order to prove that the
state did not need a go-slow approach. The constitutional framework
that legitimizes a purported rationale like caution requires more than just
abstract principles: It requires us all to be phenomenologists.
B. Marriage as a Fundamental Right and a Social Good
In an unbroken line of cases, the Supreme Court has stated that the
freedom to marry is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause. In Perry, gay persons are asking to be let into this institution and
to exercise a right enjoyed by everyone else. Liberal toleration is on its
sturdiest ground here, as the Perry plaintiffs argued before the district
court and the Ninth Circuit. But even in this jurisprudence about choice,
liberty, and freedom is the recognition of the social importance of the

than formerly.”).
176. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 999.
180. Transcript of Record at 596:13–597:3, 605:18–25, 600:12–602:15, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(No. 10-16696) (noting that data from Massachusetts on the “annual rates for marriage and for
divorce” for “the four years prior to same-sex marriage being legal and the four years after” show
“that the rates of marriage and divorce are no different after [same-sex] marriage was permitted than
they were before”); Plaintiff’s Exhibit at 1145, 1195, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 10-16696)
(explaining that race, employment status, education, age, and other factors impact the success of
marriages, not sexual orientation).
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institution of marriage. That marriage is both a right and a social good is
a testament to the way liberal toleration must work in tandem with a
more robust sociological construct.
181
In Turner v. Safley, the Court affirmed that “the decision to marry is
182
183
a fundamental right.” It reiterated that finding in Zablocki v. Redhail.
184
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Court stated even more
explicitly that it has long been “recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by
185
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Griswold v.
186
187
Connecticut and Loving v. Virginia allowed the Court to restate further
that the “freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
188
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
At different times, the right to marry has been couched as a right of
189
190
191
192
liberty, privacy, intimate choice, and association. In all cases, the
right is universal, nondiscriminatory, and centered on the individual’s
choice. Liberal toleration can succeed here, as evidenced by the American
Foundation for Equal Rights’s successful arguments in this vein at the
193
district court.
But these and other cases are not simply about the saliency of a right
to choose a spouse; they are also about marriage as a social good. Long
ago, the Court characterized marriage as more than just a choice; in fact, it
194
was “the most important relation in life.” It was at “the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor

181. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
182. Id. at 95.
183. 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“The right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”).
184. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
185. Id. at 639–40.
186. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”).
187. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
188. Id. at 12.
189. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“The right to marry is of fundamental
importance for all individuals.”).
190. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—
older than our political parties, older than our school system.”); see, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
598–600 nn.23–26 (1977).
191. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (“The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws
and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”); id. at 574 (referring to “the respect
the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these [intimate] choices”).
192. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and the
upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in
our society.’”).
193. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991–93 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
194. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
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195

progress.” Marriage was both “fundamental to the very existence and
196
survival of the [human] race” and an expression “of emotional support
197
and public commitment.” And immediately after calling a right to marry
an inherent part of the right to privacy in Griswold, the Court went
further, stating that:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved
198
in our prior decisions.

Marriage is sacred and noble; it is essential and loving. These values are
part of what makes the right to marry fundamental. That is, it is insufficient
to call the decision to marry a matter of fundamental liberty, privacy, or
intimate association. It is indeed all of those things, but what makes
marriage a fundamental decision is, in large part, the institution’s role in
the good life.
This symbiotic relationship between social values and individual
liberty took center stage in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
199
Under
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.
Massachusetts law, antigay marriage discrimination violated the “respect
200
for individual autonomy and equality under law.” Everyone, regardless
of sexual orientation, had a right to choose “whether and whom to
201
marry.” But civil marriage was not just a right. It was “at once a deeply
personal commitment to another human being and a highly public
celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity,
202
and family.” These values are, at a minimum, a parallel means of
understanding why the right to marry is fundamental.
Liberty, autonomy, and privacy are important, but it is not clear why
marriage would be elevated to fundamental status when there are
countless other rights and privileges founded on those liberal principles
unless there is something special about marriage. Even the constitutional
framework for determining whether a right is fundamental recognizes this.
In Perry, Judge Walker referred to the two part test in Washington v.
203
Glucksberg to determine “the history, tradition and practice of marriage

195. Id. at 211.
196. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
197. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
198. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
199. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). This argument comes directly from Sandel, Justice, supra note
80, at 256–60.
200. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.
201. Id. at 959.
202. Id. at 954.
203. 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
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204

in the United States.” His analysis is striking in its fidelity to the
language of liberal toleration: Marriage, he found, has always been about
“free consent” and the state’s respect for “an individual’s choice to build a
205
Marriage also changed to toss aside race and gender
family.”
206
discrimination without altering the core of the institution, which was
always about “the right to choose a spouse and, with mutual consent, join
207
together and form a household.”
While Judge Walker’s conclusions are steeped in the substance and
rhetoric of liberal toleration, some of the evidence presented at trial was
not. Nancy Cott, a Harvard historian and expert witness for the plaintiffs
208
in Perry, testified that civil marriage is both a civil right and state
209
“recognition and approval” of a union. She and other witnesses testified
that the state licenses marriages “to create stable households in which the
210
adults who reside there . . . will support one another” and to channel
211
benefits, rights, and responsibilities through marriage. State marriage
212
promotes physical and
recognition encourages mutual support,
213
psychological health, and ensures that these benefits flow to children and
214
to society as a whole. It is no wonder that plaintiffs dedicated nearly onethird of their time in court to testimony on the social value of marriage and
that Judge Walker dedicated nearly three pages of his findings of fact to
that evidence.
This discussion of the social good of marriage dovetailed nicely with
Judge Walker’s ultimate conclusion that the Perry plaintiffs were simply
seeking to exercise a fundamental right that belongs to everyone. Perry,
like Turner, Zablocki, Griswold, Loving, and the long list of other
federal marriage cases that came before it, recognizes that the
fundamental nature of the marriage right is founded on more than just a
respect for liberty and autonomy. If it were not—if liberal toleration and
Michelman’s robust defense were sufficient—the lengthy paeans to
marriage as a means of achieving the good life would be superfluous.
C. ROMER and the Social Importance of Marriage
The social importance of marriage is essential for the coherence of
Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district court in Perry v. Brown.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Transcript of Record, supra note 180, at 195:13–196:21.
Id. at 187:11–12.
Id. at 222:13–17; 226:8–227:4.
Id. at 1341:2–16; 235:24–236:16.
Id. at 222:13–17.
Id. at 578:2–579:9.
Id. at 1042:20–1043:8.

April 2013]

MARRIAGE RIGHTS AND THE GOOD LIFE

775

215

Relying primarily on Romer v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit held that Prop 8
was unconstitutional because it unjustifiably took away marriage rights
216
from gay Californians. We have already discussed how the constitutional
proxy for justification in this case, rational basis review, goes beyond the
217
rhetoric and substance of liberal toleration. And without including
arguments that would normally be beyond the reach of liberal toleration,
the court’s reliance on Romer would be strained, at best.
To avoid a decision on whether gay couples may ever be lawfully
denied the right to marry, the Ninth Circuit found that—like the
constitutional amendment at issue in Romer—Prop 8 violated the Equal
Protection Clause by excluding gays and lesbians from a right they, and
218
everyone else, had already enjoyed. In Romer, the citizens of Colorado
passed Amendment 2, a constitutional amendment that prohibited the
state and any subdivision thereof from passing any ordinance that
219
banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It, therefore,
took away from gays and lesbians—but from no one else—any right to
engage in local, county, and state politics to secure protections against
220
discrimination, and it did so out of pure animus toward gays.
This conclusion did not require the court to venture far from the
limits of liberal toleration. Amendment 2 did not require any discussion
of social goods for rational basis review because its breadth was so far
removed from any possible justification, whatever it may be. More
explicitly, discriminatory “laws of this sort” were inimical to the
Constitution because of its guarantee of equal protection and “the
principle that government . . . remain open on impartial terms to all who
221
seek its assistance.” Amendment 2, then, violated the terms of liberal
toleration in the most literal sense: It denied the neutrality of the
framework of justice in favor of the comprehensive dogma that gays are
somehow worse than everyone else.
Yet despite the Ninth Circuit’s efforts to restrict its own decision to
liberal toleration, any parallel between Amendment 2 and Prop 8
requires an assessment of the social good of gay marriages. In In re

215. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
216. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2012) (“All that Proposition 8 accomplished
was to take away from same-sex couples the right to be granted marriage licenses and thus legally to
use the designation of ‘marriage,’ which symbolizes state legitimization and societal recognition of
their committed relationships. Proposition 8 serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen
the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify their
relationships and families as inferior to those of opposite-sex couples. The Constitution simply does
not allow for ‘laws of this sort.’”).
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064.
219. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284–85 (Colo. 1993).
220. Evans v. Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996).
221. Id. at 633.
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222

Marriage Cases,
the California Supreme Court held California’s
statutory ban on same-sex marriage recognition unconstitutional. When
Prop 8 took that right away, the Ninth Circuit said, gay and lesbian
Californians were put in the same disadvantaged position as gay and
223
lesbian Coloradans after the passage of Amendment 2. Both Prop 8
and Amendment 2 singled “out a certain class of citizens for disfavored
224
225
legal status.” Both had the “peculiar property” of withdrawing “from
226
homosexuals, but no others” a pre-existing legal right. Both denied
227
equal protection “in the most literal sense.” Both constitutionalized the
228
“special disability upon” gays alone.
The Ninth Circuit conceded that Amendment 2 effected a
229
substantially broader harm and even correctly interpreted Romer as
230
basing its animus holding on both the breadth of the harm and its laser231
like focus on gays and lesbians. Justice Kennedy made this explicitly
clear:
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even [rational basis review]. First,
the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group. . . . Second, its
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
232
class it affects.

A finding of animus, therefore, requires more than just bald discrimination
against a traditionally disadvantaged group; Romer found animus because
the “breadth of the amendment [was] so far removed” from the purported
state interests.
To make the parallel between Prop 8 and Amendment 2 persuasive,
then, the Ninth Circuit had to argue that Prop 8 was discriminatorily
222. 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
223. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2012). “Proposition 8 is remarkably similar to
Amendment 2.” Id. at 1080.
224. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
225. Id. at 632 (quoted in Perry, 671 F.3d at 1081).
226. Id. at 627 (quoted in Perry, 671 F.3d at 1081).
227. Id. at 633.
228. Id. at 631.
229. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1081.
230. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion refers to the breadth of the underlying law ten
different times. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (“Amendment 2, in explicit terms, does more than repeal or
rescind”); id. at 627 (“[s]weeping and comprehensive”); id. (the change is “far reaching”); id. at 629
(Amendment 2 has “severe consequence[s], but there is more”); id. at 630 (“broad language”); id. at
632 (“a broad and undifferentiated disability”); id. (“sheer breadth”); id. at 633 (“too broad”); id.
(“denies [gays] protection across the board”); id. at 635 (“breadth of the amendment”). What’s more,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion contrasts Amendment 2 to other classifications that met rational basis
review and “were narrow enough in scope.” Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
231. Evans v. Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996) (“Amendment 2 . . . impos[ed] a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group . . . . [by] identif[ying] persons by a single trait and
then den[ying] them protection across the board.”).
232. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
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precise and exceedingly broad. Prop 8 obviously singled out gays and
233
lesbians for a particular burden, but it was narrower than Amendment 2:
It took away the word “marriage,” but left intact all the other rights and
234
responsibilities of family law for gay Californians. The case for Prop 8’s
breadth required the court to move beyond the rhetoric and substance of
rights and argue for the social value of gay relationships and marriage.
235
That designation had “extraordinary significance.” It is the name that
236
“society gives to the relationship that matters most between two adults.”
The word “marriage,” the court found, “is singular in connoting ‘a
harmony of living,’ ‘a bilateral loyalty,’ and ‘a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
237
sacred,’” quoting Supreme Court precedent on marriage as a social good.
The word “marriage” is more than a word, it “expresses validation, by the
state and the community, and that serves as a symbol . . . of something
238
profoundly important.”
Even the experience of everyday life informs the court’s argument for
the social good of the marriage designation. We fill out paperwork that
asks us if we are “single” or “married” and ask the ones we love, “Will you
239
marry me?” not “Will you become my domestic partner?” And any word
so dyed in the wool of Western culture that it figures prominently in the
240
241
242
work of Groucho Marx, William Shakespeare, Abraham Lincoln,
243
244
Frank Sinatra, and even one of Marilyn Monroe’s most famous movies
has to be rhetorically and socially important. Marriage conveys meaning,
pops up in common rhetorical tropes about love and lust, and expresses
society’s blessing for “harmonious, loyal, enduring, and intimate
245
relationships.” Denying this designation, the profundity of which is
proven by the communal importance of the marital union and the
rhetorical saliency of the word “marriage” in everyday life, is to wreak an
233. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1076 (“Proposition 8 worked a singular and limited change to the California
Constitution: it stripped same-sex couples of the right to have their committed relationships
recognized by the State with the designations of ‘marriage.’”); id. at 1081 (“[T]he surgical precision
with which [Prop 8] excises a right belonging to gay and lesbian couples makes it even more suspect.”).
234. Id. at 1086 (“Proposition 8 had absolutely no effect on the ability of same-sex couples to
become parents or the manner in which children are raised in California. . . . Proposition 8 in no way
modified the state’s laws governing parentage, which are distinct from its laws governing marriage.”).
235. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (“Marriage is a wonderful institution . . . but who wants to live in an institution.”).
241. Id. (“A young man married is a man that’s marr’d.”).
242. Id. (“Marriage is neither heaven nor hell, it is simply purgatory.”).
243. Id. (“A man doesn’t know what happiness is until he’s married. By then it’s too late.”).
244. Id. (noting that the title, “How to Marry a Millionaire,” conveyed more meaning than “How
to Register a Domestic Partnership with a Millionaire”).
245. Id.
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incomparable social harm on gay couples. This analysis is not about rights,
equality, or liberty; it reflects the Durkheimian understanding that the
state recognizes a given union as a marriage for reasons beyond the
realm of liberal toleration. Marriage is an integral part of the good life,
not merely a tolerant one.

Conclusion
In this Article, I have aimed to show both the benefits and limits of a
legal argument for ending marriage discrimination based on the language
and substance of Rawlsian liberal toleration, as well as to explain the
nature of the constitutional argument as reflective of the sociology of
marriage within society. Liberalism’s focus on liberty, freedom, and
equality seem like great allies of the gay rights movement; after all, most
opposition to letting gay Americans into the institution of marriage is
based on religion or other comprehensive moralities that have no place in
the liberal political sphere. And yet the nature of marriage is much more
than a free, voluntary union of two autonomous individuals. It is a
stabilizing, loving arrangement that can benefit its participants and society
as a whole in ways that are far removed from the rhetoric of liberalism.
Because marriage is more than just a right, because it is a “social fact,” to
use Durkheim’s phrase, of the good life, liberal toleration can only take
us so far. Even Michelman’s defense of a more robust form of Rawlsian
liberalism fails to adequately address the role that the sociology of
marriage and gay relationships will play in proving, as a matter of law,
the unlawfulness of denying from gays the designation of marriage. The
Constitution recognizes this: Equal Protection and Due Process arguments
for ending marriage discrimination demand that we join arguments about
liberty with arguments about the social value of marriage in society and
in everyday life.
Though my focus has been the constitutional case for marriage, the
symbiotic relationship between liberalism and sociology may suggest
ways to effectively win the hearts and minds of American voters and
legislatures who have the chance to vote on marriage recognition. In
2008, the “No on 8” campaign—the well-funded group that took the lead
in opposing Proposition 8 in California—made the mistake of ignoring
everyday experience and the social value of marriage in its advertisements.
Its various commercials never featured a gay couple in love, and its spots
rarely, if ever, mentioned the word “marriage.” One commercial featured
California’s Superintendent of Public Instruction Jack O’Connell telling
viewers that “Prop. 8 has nothing to do with schools or kids. Our schools
246
aren’t required to teach anything about marriage.” Instead, the pro-gay
246. NoOnProp8dotcom, Prop 8 Has Nothing to Do with Schools, YouTube (Oct. 22, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIL7PUl24hE.
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campaign preferred neutral statements about rights—“Regardless of how
you feel about marriage, it’s wrong to treat people differently under the
247
law” —hoping to appeal to Californians’ liberal core. Loving gay
couples, their children, and their families, all were excised purposely
from the “No on 8” campaign: The message they wanted to convey was
248
about rights and freedom, not about love, commitment, and marriage.
249
Prop 8 passed with a little more than 52% of the vote.
The exclusively liberal “No on 8” campaign contrasts with the
political campaign that Freedom to Marry coordinated in Washington
State, Maine, Minnesota, and Maryland, the four states where marriage
nondiscrimination won in the 2012 election. Their ads featured gay
couples, like Richard Door and John Mace, who recently married after
250
being together for sixty-two years. In Minnesota, a former Marine and
his wife of nearly sixty years talked about what their marriage means to
them—“the happiness and the love that we’ve enjoyed”—and said that
251
gay people should experience the same happiness. In Maine, the Why
Marriage Matters website told personal stories about love and
252
commitment and the societal benefits of marriage for all. Volunteers
talked about love and living long lives together in peace, not about
253
getting religion and morality out of their private lives. The pattern is
clear: Freedom to Marry has learned from the omissions and errors of
the “No on 8” campaign and has coupled messages about equality with
homages to marriage’s role in the good life. And marriage freedom won
254
in all four states, causing a radical shift in the public debate over
marriage in America. If we recognize the legal weight of marriage
arguments based on social value and the good life—in addition to liberal
toleration—we may be successful in court as well.
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